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Fixed Price Preemptive Rights in
California: The Quality of Mercer is
Strained
By PHIL MILLER*
The right of alienation is an inherent and inseparable quality of an
estate in fee simple. .... Therefore, any and all restraints. . . neces-
sarily must be repugnant to and inconsistent with the grant, and, as
such, void.1
A preemptive right. . . merely requires the owner, when and if he
decides to sell, to offer the property first to the person entitled to the
preemptive right at the stipulated price and is valid.2
The above quotations indicate more than a simple difference of
opinion between Divisions Two and Four of California's Second Ap-
pellate District. They indicate a deeply rooted conflict in California
property law. The conflict can be phrased in several ways. In its
broadest form, the conflict concerns the validity of restraints on aliena-
tion-limitations on the ability to convey an interest in one's property,
however, whenever, and to whomever one chooses, at whatever price
one's business judgment or whimsy dictates. More precisely, the con-
flict concerns the validity of a particular type of restraint on aliena-
tion-the right of first refusal, or preemptive right.3
As its name implies, a preemptive right obligates the owner of
property, when and if he or she decides to sell the property, to offer it
first to the holder of the preemptive right. If the holder (or preemp-
tioner) elects not to exercise the right to buy, the owner has fulfilled his
or her obligation and is free to sell the property to any third party.4
Unlike an option contract, the holder of a preemptive right has no
* B.A., 1974, University of California at Santa Cruz; J.D., 1977, Hastings College of
the Law. Writing Instructor, University of Puget Sound School of Law.
1. Title Guar. & Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal. App. 152, 160, 183 P. 470, 473 (1919).
2. Mercer v. Lemmens, 230 Cal. App. 2d 167, 170, 40 Cal. Rptr. 803, 805 (1964).
3. Preemptive rights have been known through the years by many different names,
including right of first refusal, first opportunity to purchase, first right to purchase, first privi-
lege to purchase, refusal of purchase, and double option. See Schwartz v. Shapiro, 229 Cal.
App. 2d 238, 255, 40 CaL Rptr. 189, 201 (1964).
4. Preemptive rights also may arise in lease transactions, ie., the lessee may hold a
preemptive right to renew the lease should the lessor choose to lease the property again at
power to compel an unwilling landowner to sell; the preemptive right
arises only when the owner elects to sell the property.
5
The price term of a preemptive right provision generally takes one
of two forms: the preemptioner has the right to purchase property ei-
ther at a price equal to the best offer received from a third party or at a
fixed price stated in the agreement creating the right.6 In light of the
tendency of real property values to increase over time,7 a fixed price
preemptive right imposes a substantially greater restraint on alienation
than a "best offer" preemptive right. If the value of the property has
increased significantly over time, an owner who is bound by a fixed
price term is forced either to retain the land or to sell it at a substantial
sacrifice. This danger that fixed price preemptive agreements will hin-
der transfers of interests in real property is the heart of the conflict in
California.
Despite this potential restraint on alienation, the California Court
of Appeal twice has explicitly upheld fixed price preemptive agree-
ments.8 These decisions are not totally persuasive, however, for two
reasons. First, the cases provide little more than a superficial analysis
of the danger to real property interests posed by such provisions.9 Sec-
ond, the cases appear to be in sharp opposition to recent California
case law concerning other types of restraints on alienation.10 Contrib-
uting to this uncertainty is a single California Supreme Court decision
in which the court, apparently in dicta, declared that fixed price pre-
the expiration of the existing lease. See, e.g., Ablett v. Clauson, 43 Cal. 2d 280, 272 P.2d 753
(1954); Falkenstein v. Popper 81 Cal. App. 2d 131, 183 P.2d 707 (1947).
5. Mercer v. Lemmons, 230 Cal. App. 2d 167, 170, 40 Cal. Rptr. 803, 805 (1964).
6. Other less common preemptive right provisions exist. For example, the right might
be set at the "fair market value" of the property. While at first glance this would appear to
be the same as the "best offer" price, there might be one or more buyers who, for reasons of
their own, are willing to pay in excess of the fair market value. Thus, a right exercisable at
the fair market value could have certain attributes of a fixed price preemptive right. Also,
the right might be set at a stated percentage of the "best offer" price. See Annot., 2 A.L.R.
3d 701 (1965).
Because the above examples are really only variations on the basic price standards dis-
cussed in the text, this Article treats all preemptive rights as either "best offer" or "fixed
price" preemptive rights.
7. See U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1978 at 800 (99th ann. ed. 1978) (noting more than doubling of median sales price of new
one-family houses in western United States).
8. Mercer v. Lemmens, 230 Cal. App. 2d 167, 40 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1964); Schwartz v.
Shapiro, 229 Cal. App. 2d 238, 40 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1964).
9. Restraints on alienation are condemned by CAL. CIv. CODE § 711 (West 1954),
which states: "Conditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest created, are
void."
10. See text accompanying notes 36-45 infra.
[Vol. 31THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
emptive rights are void.1"
As a result of this conflicting decisional law, the validity of fixed
price preemptive rights in California remains unclear. This Article ex-
plores the conflict in California concerning the validity of fixed price
preemptive rights as they apply to the disposition of real property. The
Article first discusses the California decisions upholding fixed price
preemptive rights and then examines a line of California Supreme
Court decisions that promote policies inconsistent with the decisions
upholding such rights. After considering the conflict in California, the
Article examines the attitudes that other states have taken toward fixed
price preemptive provisions. In conclusion, the Article proposes a test
of the validity of such provisions which provides a solution to the con-
flict.
The Basis for the Conflict in California
Cases Upholding Fixed Price Preemptive Provisions
There are two cases in California that explicitly uphold preemp-
tive rights at fixed prices. In Schwartz v. Shapiro,'2 the plaintiff and
defendants entered into a contract for the joint purchase of an apart-
ment building. The parties also entered into a second agreement which
provided that, should either party decide to sell its one-half interest,
that party first must offer it to the remaining owner at the selling party's
share of the original purchase price. Some time thereafter, a dispute
arose between the parties and plaintiff filed an action for partition. De-
fendants claimed in response that they were entitled to purchase plain-
tiff's one-half interest in the apartment. Plaintiff made two assertions in
defense to this claim. First, plaintiff argued that the application for
partition was not equivalent to a sale of the property and thus the pre-
emptive right was inapplicable. Second, plaintiff claimed that if the
action for partition was deemed to be a sale, the preemptive right was
invalid as against public policy.
Although the trial court ruled that the action for partition was not
equivalent to a sale, the court of appeal reversed, concluding that the
right of partition could be enforced only after defendants were offered
the opportunity to exercise their preemptive right.13
The decision in Schwartz appeared to turn on two points. As the
first basis of its decision, the court evaluated the fairness of the price set
11. Maynard v. Polhemus, 74 Cal. 141, 15 P. 451 (1887).
12. 229 Cal. App. 2d 238, 40 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1964).
13. Id. at 253, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
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in the preemptive agreement by considering the fairness of the negotia-
tions and the value of the property at the time of contracting. 14 By
taking this approach, the court failed to recognize that the danger to
real property transactions inherent in fixed price preemptive rights is
that the property will increase in value after the agreement is entered
into, thereby creating a substantial restraint on alienation. Indeed, in
addressing the fairness and reasonableness of the price term, the court
failed even to mention the potential restraint on alienation created by
the fixed price preemptive agreement.
The court's failure to acknowledge this potential restraint is fur-
ther reflected in the second basis of the Schwartz decision. The court
relied on previous decisions in California upholding preemptive agree-
ments. 15 Analysis of the cases referred to by the court reveals, however,
that the court's reliance was misplaced. Of the six California cases
cited by the court as upholding preemptive agreements,16 only one,
Falkenstein v. Popper,17 involved a fixed price element, and this case
14. The court stated: "The basis of the trial court's conclusion that the contract is unfair
and inequitable, while not entirely clear, appears to be grounded on the fact that the prop-
erty was purchased for $143,000 but was worth $200,000 at the time of trial. The fairness
and reasonableness of the contract to convey must, however, be determined from conditions
existing at the time it was made. A subsequent increase in value is immaterial as respects
specific performance. . . . Agreements in the nature of the writing under scrutiny are not
against public policy. . . . Accordingly, agreements whereby a party is given the 'first op-
portunity' or the 'first right' or the 'first privilege' or the 'first refusal' to purchase property or
to renew a lease have been upheld in this state." Id. at 255, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 200-01. The
court went on to note: "We are not unmindful that under certain circumstances the enforce-
ment of an agreement such as the one in the instant case would be inequitable. However,
such agreements are not unfair or unconscionable per se. . . . There was no showing that
the price of $143,000 originally paid by the parties was inadequate. To the contrary, the
evidence discloses, and it is not disputed, that such price was a fair market value reached
after extensive negotiations with the previous owner. It was error, therefore, to hold that the
subject preemption agreement was inequitable." Id. at 256-57, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
15. Id. at 255, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
16. Id. The California cases cited by the court were Nelson v. Reisner, 51 Cal. 2d 161,
331 P.2d 17 (1958); Ablett v. Clauson, 43 Cal. 2d 280, 272 P.2d 753 (1954); Richfield Oil v.
Security-First Nat'l Bank, 159 Cal. App. 2d 184, 323 P.2d 865 (1958); Showcase Properties,
Inc. v. Winer, 139 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 934, 294 P.2d 195 (1956); Moreno v. Blinn, 81 Cal.
App. 2d 852, 185 P.2d 332 (1947); Falkenstein v. Popper, 81 Cal. App. 2d 131, 183 P.2d 707
(1947). The court also cited a New York case, R.I. Realty Co. v. Terrell, 254 N.Y. 121, 172
N.E. 262 (1930).
Three of the California cases cited by the court deal with preemptive rights to purchase
property at a price equal to the best offer received from a third party (Richfield; Showcase
Properties; and Moreno); one concerns a preemptive right to renew a lease at a rental fee
equal to the best offer received from a third party (Nelson); and one deals with a preemptive
right to renew a lease at a rental fee to be agreed upon by the parties at the time of renewal
(Ablett).
17. 81 Cal. App. 2d 131, 183 P.2d 707 (1947).
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was decided on a different issue. In Falkenstein, the defendant-lessor
gave the plaintiff-lessee an absolute two-year option to purchase the
leased property for a stated price. For three years after the option had
lapsed, plaintiff was given the "first opportunity to purchase said prop-
erty for said price."18 Some four years after entering into this agree-
ment, plaintiff attempted to exercise an absolute option to purchase the
property. When defendant refused, plaintiff sued for specific perform-
ance. Judgment was entered for defendant on the pleadings.
On appeal, the issue was not the validity of the fixed price element
of the agreement, but whether the language "first opportunity to
purchase" gave plaintiff an absolute option to force sale of the property
or merely a right of first refusal should defendant elect to sell. In con-
firming the judgment below, the court concluded that although plaintiff
held an absolute option for the first two years of the agreement, at the
time plaintiff sought the conveyance of the property, he held only a
preemptive right.' 9 The Falkenstein court never reached the issue of
the fixed price element. Thus, the cases cited in Schwartz, while sup-
porting the validity of "best offer" preemptive rights, do not provide
direct authority for upholding a fixed price preemptive right.
The second California case upholding a fixed price preemptive
right is Mercer v. Lemmens.20 In Mercer, plaintiff purchased a parcel
of land from defendant and obtained a preemptive right on an adjoin-
ing parcel of land at the fixed price of $10,000. When, six years later,
defendant contracted to sell the property in question to a third party for
$22,000, plaintiff attempted to assert his preemptive right to purchase
the lot for $10,000. Defendant refused to honor the right, and plaintiff
brought suit.
The trial court entered judgment for plaintiff in the sum of
$12,000, the difference between the property's fair market value and
plaintiffs preemptive right price of $10,000. In affirming the trial
court's decision, the court of appeal paid virtually no attention to the
fixed price element of the agreement. 21 Instead, it focused almost en-
tirely on the distinction between absolute options and true preemptive
18. Id. at 132, 183 P.2d at 707.
19. Id. at 133, 183 P.2d at 708.
20. 230 Cal. App. 167,40 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1964). According to Witkin, the Mercer deci-
sion embodies the California rule on the validity of fixed price preemptive rights. 3 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 318, at 2206-07 (8th ed. 1973). Although Witkin
appears to acknowledge the possibility of some uncertainty regarding fixed price preemptive
rights in California, he does not appear to fully appreciate the severity of the conflict.
21. The court in Mercer, as the court in Schwartz, addressed the reasonableness of the
fixed price term merely by stating that "simply because the property increased substantially
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rights.22 The court cited no California decisions as authority for its
unconditional validation of fixed price preemptive agreements. Nor
did it offer any further explanation or justification for upholding fixed
price preemptive rights in light of their potential restraint on alienation.
Indeed, the decision appears to assume that the validity of fixed price
preemptive rights was settled beyond the need for discussion.
Notwithstanding the failure of the Schwartz and Mercer courts to
identify and discuss the dangers presented by fixed price preemptive
agreements, the decisions, standing alone, appear to validate such
agreements in California without regard to the quantum of restraint on
alienation that might result from a subsequent increase in the value of
the subject property.
There exists, however, another line of cases in California which
promotes policies in direct conflict with the holdings in both Schwartz
and Mercer.23 Interestingly, none of the cases in either line of decisions
even acknowledges that a divergence of opinion exists. The matter is
further complicated by the fact that several important cases in this sec-
ond line deal not with fixed price preemptive rights, but rather with a
somewhat different type of restraint on alienation, due-on-sale and
due-on-encumbrance clauses. 24 Nevertheless, as will be seen, several
decisions by the California Supreme Court imply that both fixed price
preemptive rights and due-on clauses are but different manifestations
of the same evil-restraints on alienation.
in value in the meantime the exercise of the preemptive right is not rendered unreasonable."
Id. at 172, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
22. Indeed, the mere mention of the fixed price element seemed almost chance: "The
distinction between an option and a preemptive right is well-recognized in the law. A pre-
emptive right does not give the preemptioner the power to compel an unwilling owner to
sell; it merely requires the owner, when and if he decides to sell, to offer the property first to
the person entitled to the preemptive right at the stipulated price and is valid." Id. at 170, 40
Cal. Rptr. at 805.
23. See notes 25-45 & accompanying text infra.
24. Due-on-sale clauses are typically found in financing agreements. For example, a
bank might make a loan for the purchase of a home contingent upon the continued owner-
ship of the home by the original borrowers. If the original borrowers convey the home
before the full amount of the loan is repaid, the bank can accelerate all future mortgage
payments. The balance of the loan thus is "due-on" the sale of the home by the original
borrowers. This is one method by which a bank can protect itself from having an outstand-
ing loan assumed by persons with unacceptable credit status. Due-on-encumbrance clauses
allow acceleration of outstanding indebtedness upon the mere encumbrance of security
property. Like fixed price preemptive rights, due-on clauses act as restraints on the ability to
freely alienate property; acceleration of the unpaid balance of a home loan creates a sub-
stantial risk of foreclosure-a clear disincentive to alienation. For a discussion of the due-
on clause under California law see Note, Wellenkamp P. Bank of America. A Victoryfor the
Consumer?, 31 HASTInGs L.J. 275 (1979).
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Cases Tending to Negate the Validity of Fixed Price Preemptive Provisions
Until 1964, a consistent line of California Supreme Court deci-
sions had interpreted section 711 of the California Civil Code25 to re-
quire an absolute ban on all restraints on alienation. These cases dealt
with both preemptive and nonpreemptive agreements that posed re-
straints on alienation.
In the 1883 decision in Murray v. Green,26 the supreme court inval-
idated a provision of a deed in fee simple which prohibited sale of the
subject property by the grantee without the written consent of a named
third party. Citing section 711, the court held the provision to consti-
tute an invalid restraint on alienation. 27 Rejecting the argument that
the restraint was only a partial restraint and therefore valid, the court
queried: "[I]s it not obvious in case of a grant in fee simple, where there
is no possibility of reverter, any restraint whatever on the power of
alienation would be repugnant to the interests created by the grant?"
28
In Maynard v. Polhemus,29 the supreme court invalidated a clause
in a deed providing that if the grantee ever desired to sell the property,
the grantee should offer it to the original grantor at the grantee's
purchase price. Unfortunately, the opinion does not make clear
whether the court invalidated the clause on the ground that it was a
condition creating a fixed price preemptive right or on the ground that,
as a purely personal covenant, the benefit legitimately could not run to
the grantor's heirs. Nevertheless, the court did note that should the
clause be "regarded as a condition, it is unreasonable, and contrary to
the policy of the law, because in restraint of alienation. '30 Although
this statement very well may be dicta, it serves to show that the court
considered fixed price preemptive rights to be void.
The rule laid down in Murray was adhered to3' until 1964, when
the California Supreme Court decided Coast Bank v. Minderhout.32 In
that case, plaintiff-bank made several loans to Burton and Donald En-
25. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1954) states: "Conditions restraining alienation, when
repugnant to the interest created, are void."
26. 64 Cal. 363, 28 P. 118 (1883).
27. Id. at 366, 28 P. at 120.
28. Id. at 367, 28 P. at 120 (emphasis added).
29. 74 Cal. 141, 15 P. 451 (1887).
30. Id. at 143, 15 P. at 452 (citing Murray v. Green, 64 Cal. 363, 28 P. 118 (1883), and
§ 711).
31. Eg., Bonnell v. McLaughlin, 173 Cal. 213, 159 P. 590 (1916); Prey v. Stanley, 110
Cal. 423, 42 P. 908 (1895); Warton v. Mollinet, 103 Cal. App. 2d 710, 229 P.2d 861 (1951);
Title Guar. & Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal. App. 152, 183 P. 470 (1919).
32. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
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right, both of whom executed a promissory note for the amount of the
indebtedness and secured the loan with real property. In a separate
instrument signed shortly thereafter, plaintiff and the Enrights executed
an agreement concerning the property containing a standard due-on-
sale clause. 33
One year later, the Enrights conveyed the subject property to de-
fendants. Plaintiff elected to accelerate the amount of unpaid indebted-
ness, but being unable to collect the unpaid balance, brought an action
to foreclose its alleged equitable mortgage on the subject property. De-
fendants objected that the due-on-sale clause represented an invalid re-
straint on alienation.
A unanimous court held that an absolute ban on restraints on
alienation was no longer necessary in California, as "the rule .. .
needlessly invalidates reasonable restraints designed to protect justifia-
ble interests of the parties. ' 34 The court concluded that the bank's in-
terest in conditioning its extension of credit to the Enrights upon their
retaining an interest in the property securing the debt was justified and
validated the restraint on alienation inherent in the due-on-sale
clause. 35
In two cases following Minderhout, however, the California
Supreme Court made it clear that the rather sharp break with tradition
announced in Minderhout was to be strictly construed. In La Sala v.
American Savings and Loan Association,36 plaintiffs Frank and Grace
La Sala borrowed money from defendant American to purchase certain
property, giving American a deed of trust containing a standard due-
on-encumbrance clause. Seven years later, the La Salas borrowed
money from a third party, giving that party a second deed of trust on
the subject property. Upon learning of this, American reminded the La
Salas of its right to accelerate the debt, but offered to waive the right in
33. For a brief definition of due-on clauses see note 24 supra.
34. 61 Cal. 2d at 316, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508. The court went on to note
that California law already had recognized several interests which justified reasonable re-
straints on alienation: spendthrift trusts (because of the settlor's interest in protecting poten-
tially improvident beneficiaries); a lease for a term of years (because of the lessor's interest in
the personal character of the lessee); a life estate (because of the interest of the remainder-
man in the life tenant's character); the transfer of certain corporate stock (because of the
interest of shareholders in the persons with whom they are in business); and executory land
contracts (because of the vendor's interest in the upkeep of the property and in the character
and integrity of the purchaser).
Of equal interest, the court in Minderhout did not note the line of cases soon to be relied
upon in Schwartz as validating "best offer" preemptive rights.
35. Id. at 317, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
36. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
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return for payment of $150 and an increase in the rate of interest on the
first deed of trust. The La Salas, together with another person exper-
iencing a nearly identical problem, filed a class action seeking, inter
alia, to have the due-on-encumbrance clause declared void. When
American offered to waive the clause as to the named plaintiffs, the
trial court dismissed the action without notice to the class.
After ruling that the trial court had erred in dismissing the action
without notice to the class, the California Supreme Court addressed
American's contention that the due-on-encumbrance clause was valid
as a matter of law. The court, while reaffirming the holding in Minder-
hour that the sale of security property may justify a restraint on aliena-
tion, concluded that the mere encumbrance of security property
provides much less justification for imposing restraints. In reaching its
conclusion, the court reasoned that the salient feature distinguishing
due-on-sale from due-on-encumbrance clauses was the likelihood of
risk to the lender's security.37 The court found that the risk to the
lender that would arise from the mere encumbrance of security prop-
erty would justify a restraint on alienation only when the restraint was
"reasonably necessary to avert danger to the lender's security. ' 38
The rule announced in Minderhout was limited further in Tucker v.
Lassen Savings andLoan Association.39 In Tucker, plaintiffs purchased
land financed by defendant Lassen, giving Lassen a deed of trust con-
taining a due-on-sale clause. Plaintiffs subsequently entered into an
installment land contract with a third party, under which plaintiffs
were to retain title to the property until the full purchase price had been
paid. Upon learning of the contract, Lassen sought to enforce the due-
on clause and, when plaintiffs failed to pay, filed a notice of default.
Lassen and the third party subsequently entered into an agreement
whereby the third party purchaser assumed the existing loan at an in-
creased interest rate. The plaintiffs sued Lassen for loss of anticipated
profits on the installment land contract, contending that the due-on-
sale clause was an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
The trial court held for the plaintiffs, concluding that the install-
ment land contract in no way impaired the defendant's security interest
in the land and that Lassen's enforcement of the due-on-sale clause was
therefore unreasonable. In affirming the ruling below, the California
Supreme Court first noted that the Minderhout decision validated due-
on-sale clauses only when they were reasonably necessary to protect a
37. Id. at 880, 489 P.2d at 1144, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
38. Id at 882, 489 P.2d at 1144, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
39. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
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lender's security interest.40 After recognizing the limits of the Minder-
hout holding, the court formally adopted a two prong test to be used in
determining the reasonableness of due-on clauses. Under this new test,
the reasonableness of a due-on clause was to be judged by balancing
the justification for the restraint against the quantum of the restraint
resulting from the clause.4' In explaining the test, the court stated that
"[lo the degree that enforcement of the clause would result in an in-
creased quantum of actual restraint on alienation in the particular case,
a greater justification for such enforcement from the standpoint of the
lender's legitimate interests will be required in order to warrant en-
forcement. '42 Applying the test to the facts before it, the court con-
cluded that, for installment land contracts in which the original
borrower retains an interest in the property which provides a consider-
able incentive to maintain the property, a due-on-sale clause will be
enforced only if the lender can demonstrate a threat to its interest suffi-
cient to justify the restraint.43 As in La Sala, the court in Tucker, while
not directly overruling Minderhout, cast serious doubt on its continued
viability.
Finally, in Wellenkamp v. Bank of America44 the California
Supreme Court specifically overruled Minderhout. In Wellenkamp, the
plaintiff, who had purchased a parcel of residential real property,
sought an injunction against the defendant bank's enforcement of a
due-on-sale clause contained in a deed of trust given as security by the
seller of the property. In concluding that the per se reasonableness of
due-on-sale clauses announced in Minderhout allowed too great a re-
straint on alienation, the court pointed out that although circumstances
might arise that would justify the lender's enforcement of a due-on
clause in the event of an outright sale, "the mere fact of sale is not in
itself sufficient to warrant enforcement of the clause, and the restraint
on alienation resulting therefrom . . .45
With the decision in Wellenkamp, the California Supreme Court
seems to have come nearly full circle, moving from the absolute ban on
restraints announced in Murray to the liberalization in Minderhout,
and back to the very strict justification required in Wellenkamp. But
the path of logic followed by the court leads to a dilemma: how can the
40. Id. at 634, 526 P.2d at 1172, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
41. Id at 636, 526 P.2d at 1173, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
42. Id.
43. Id at 639, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
44. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
45. Id. at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385. See Note, Wellenkamp v. Bank of
America. A Victoryfor the Consumer?, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 275 (1979).
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line of decisions beginning with Murray and culminating in Wel-
lenkamp be reconciled with the blanket approval of fixed price pre-
emptive rights found in the decisions in Schwartz and Mercer?
One possible means of reconciling these cases involves drawing a
meaningful distinction between the due-on provisions in La Sala,
Tucker, and Wellenkamp and the preemptive provisions in Schwartz
and Mercer. Regardless of this approach's initial appeal, however, it
proves useless; both the Murray and Maynard decisions struck down
preemptive provisions-results which are inconsistent with those in
Schwartz and Mercer.46 Moreover, the factual context of the Maynard
decision arguably is indistinguishable from that in Mercer.47
A more plausible justification for the inconsistencies between the
two lines of cases is that, since both Schwartz and Mercer were decided
several months after Minderhout relaxed the ban on restraints on alien-
ation, the courts in both cases might have concluded that the restraints
imposed in those cases were justifiable under the new rule announced
in Minderhout. This explanation, however, ignores the fact that neither
the Schwartz nor the Mercer opinion cited the decision in Minderhout
as authority for its conclusion.
The most obvious and inviting explanation for the Schwartz and
Mercer decisions is that the courts deciding those cases simply were
unaware of the decisions in Murray and Maynard. Indeed, neither the
Schwartz nor the Mercer opinion makes reference to either of these
cases.
Regardless of the explanation for the decisions in Schwartz and
Mercer, the supreme court's present posture on restraints on alienation,
as articulated in Wellenkamp, must be considered to assess accurately
the treatment fixed price preemptive rights likely will receive in the
future. This is particularly important in light of the fact that Wel-
lenkamp emphasizes that restraints on alienation, although disfavored,
may be upheld under certain circumstances.48 Thus, even assuming
that the Schwartz and Mercer cases were decided incorrectly at the
time, the question remains: under what circumstances, if any, should
California acknowledge the validity of preemptive rights at fixed
46. See notes 25-30 & accompanying text supra.
47. Both Mercer and Maynard involved a buyer's obligation to offer a parcel of land
first to his or her seller should the buyer ever wish to resell. See notes 20-22, 29-30 & accom-
panying text supra.
48. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 952, 582 P.2d 970, 976, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379, 385 (1978).
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prices? In addressing this question, much can be learned from an ex-
amination of how other states view fixed price preemptive rights.
The Rule in Other States
According to the Restatement of Property, a best offer preemptive
right is an acceptable restraint on alienation, provided it does not vio-
late the rule against perpetuities. 49 The Restatement further provides,
however, that a fixed price or a "percentage offer" 50 preemptive right is
a valid restraint on alienation if, and only if, the restraint is reasonable
under the circumstances. 51 A review of the case law in various jurisdic-
tions reveals that, although the majority of jurisdictions evaluate fixed
price preemptive rights by their overall reasonableness, 52 the standards
of reasonableness which the various jurisdictions have adopted differ
substantially.
Missouri State Highway Commission v. Stone53 represents one of
the strictest tests of reasonableness. Defendant Stone, the owner of two
adjoining lots, sold Lot 2 to appellant for $25,000. Shortly thereafter,
appellant and Stone signed and recorded a document providing that
should Stone or his heirs ever propose to sell Lot 1, appellant and his
heirs would have the opportunity to buy Lot 1 for the sum of $10,000.
The State Highway Commission subsequently condemned part of Lot
1. Both appellant and Stone asserted claims to the $4,500 condemna-
tion award. The remaining portion of Lot 1 was at that time worth
$15,000 to $18,000.
49. "A promissory restraint or forfeiture restraint on the alienation of a legal estate in
land which is in the form of a provision that the owner of the estate shall not sell the same
without first offering to a designated person the opportunity to meet, with reasonable expedi-
tion, any offer received, is valid, unless it violates the rule against perpetuities." RESTATE-
MENT OF PROPERTY § 413(1) (1944).
50. A "percentage offer" preemptive right is a right to purchase property at a fixed
percentage of the best offer received by the property's seller. See note 6 supra.
51. "A promissory restraint or forfeiture restraint on the alienation of a legal estate in
land which is in the form of a provision
(a) that the owner of the estate shall not sell the same without first offering to sell to
some designated person, either at a fixed price, or at a percentage of the price offered by
another person, or
(b) that the owner of the estate shall pay a certain percentage of the sale price to some
designated person, is valid if, and only if, the restraint is valid under the rules stated in
§§ 406-411." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 413(2) (1944). According to § 406 of the Re-
statement of Property, "a restraint on the alienation of a legal possessory estate in fee simple
which is, or but for the restraint would be, indefeasible is valid if, and only if. . . the
restraint is reasonable under the circumstances. ... Id. § 406.
52. See Annot., 40 A.L.R. 3d 920 (1971).
53. 311 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
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The trial court found the preemptive right to be invalid. In af-
firming the decision of the trial court, the court of appeal first noted
that the validity of a preemptive agreement depends upon whether the
restraint created is reasonable. The court then laid out a test by which
the reasonableness of preemptive rights could be evaluated. According
to this test, "attention must be paid (among other things) to (a) the
purpose or purposes for which the restraint is imposed; (b) the duration
of the restraint; and (c) the method of determining the price to be
paid. ' 54 Finally, specifically addressing the validity of fixed price pre-
emptive rights, the court noted that" 'a pre-emption of unlimited dura-
tion, requiring offer to the pre-emptioner for a specified sum of money,
is the most objectionable type of pre-emption.' . . . While a method of
determining price is essential to the validity of a pre-emption agree-
ment. . . , afixed price is a substantial restraint. ' 55 Applying the test
to the facts before it, the court concluded that the fixed price preemp-
tive right could not possibly serve any useful purpose.56
In reaching its conclusion, the court in Stone relied on the earlier
decision in Kershner v. Hurlburt,57 in which the Missouri Supreme
Court invalidated an agreement giving the Joneses and Kershners, co-
owners of a parcel of land, reciprocal preemptive rights to purchase one
another's interest at the original purchase price. After a dispute arose
between the parties, the Joneses sold their half of the parcel for more
than three times the original purchase price without first offering it to
the Kershners at the price fixed by the agreement.
The Kershners' request for specific performance of the preemption
agreement was denied by the trial court. In affirming the judgment of
the trial court, the supreme court recognized the problems inherent in
fixed price preemptive provisions. As the court pointed out, "where the
price is stipulated and the value of the property at the time it may be
offered for sale is much greater than its value at the time of the con-
tract, [fixed price preemptive agreements create] an obvious restraint on
alienation, since the owner will retain the property rather than sell it at
a great sacrifice." 58
Despite this language, the court was unwilling to explicitly hold
54. Id. at 589.
55. Id. at 590 (emphasis by the court).
56. Id. The court reasoned that "[i]f the property increases in value the owner is not
liable to sell, and if it decreases in value the buyer is not likely to take advantage of his pre-
emption right." Id.
57. 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1955).
58. Id. at 625.
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that all preemptive rights at fixed prices are unconditionally void, but
instead declared that all restraints should be judged upon their overall
reasonableness under the particular facts and circumstances. 59 The
court's subsequent discussion made it clear, however, that any litigant
seeking enforcement of a fixed price preemptive right would face
nearly insurmountable judicial intolerance, as evidenced by the court's
conclusion that fixed price preemptive rights "[accomplish] nothing
more, than to arbitrarily restrain the alienation of the lots for the lives
of the respective parties. . . . It follows that no socially or economi-
cally desirable objective could be accomplished by enforcing this con-
tract .... ",60
The stand taken in Stone and Kershner does not express a univer-
sal rule.61 In Tovrea v. Umphress,62 for example, the Arizona Court of
Appeals took a more liberal approach in evaluating the reasonableness
of fixed price elements. In Tovrea, Della and Edward Tovrea acquired
property located next to the family's incorporated business and used it
as their residence. Upon Edward's death, the co-trustees under his will
acquired his undivided one-half interest in the land. Shortly thereafter,
these co-trustees quitclaimed their interest to Della. Simultaneously,
the family corporation entered into an agreement with Della under
which the corporation received a fixed price preemptive right to
purchase the property. 63 The agreement further provided that should
Della die still owning the property, the corporation would have the
right to purchase the land from her estate on the same terms. Some
twenty years later, the corporation assigned this preemptive right to
Philip Tovrea. Upon his death, the preemptive right passed to the
trustees under his will. When Della subsequently died, the trustees
under Philip's will elected to exercise their right to purchase the prop-
erty. The residuary legatees under Della's will commenced an action to
quiet title to the property and Philip's trustees counterclaimed for spe-
cific performance.
In upholding the validity of the preemptive right, the court relied
upon the factors set out in the comments to the Restatement of Prop-
erty64 which, when present, support the reasonableness of a particular
59. Id. at 625-26.
60. Id. at 626.
61. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 920 (1971).
62. 27 Ariz. App. 513, 556 P.2d 814 (1976).
63. Apparently the fixed price term agreed upon was essentially equivalent to one-half
of the fair market value of the home at the time of the property's disposition. Id at 515, 556
P.2d at 816.
64. According to the comments to the Restatement, "[elven though a restraint on alien-
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restraint on alienation. The court paid particular attention to three fac-
tors referred to in the Restatement: whether "the one imposing the re-
straint has some interest in land which he is seeking to protect by the
enforcement of the restraint";65 whether "the restraint is limited in du-
ration";66 and whether "the enforcement of the restraint accomplishes a
worthwhile purpose."67
Applying these factors to the case before it, the court concluded
that the restraint was reasonable under the circumstances. 68 First, the
party imposing the restraint, te., the family corporation, had a valid
interest in land which it was seeking to protect by enforcement of the
restraint: while Della occupied the land, the land acted as a "buffer
zone that shielded the Company from possible nuisance complaints
and litigation" 69 and assured the corporation of convenient property
for future expansion. Second, the restraint was limited in duration to
the life of Della plus a short period after her death.70 Finally, the court
felt that enforcement of the restraint accomplished a worthwhile pur-
ation is a forfeiture or promissory restraint and is qualified so as to permit alienation to some
though not all possible alienees, the restraint must still be found to be reasonable under all
the circumstances. The following factors, when found to be present, tend to support the
conclusion that the restraint is reasonable:
1. the one imposing the restraint has some interest in land which he is seeking to
protect by the enforcement of the restraint;
2. the restraint is limited in duration;
3. the enforcement of the restraint accomplishes a worthwhile purpose;
4. the type of conveyances prohibited are ones not likely to be employed to any sub-
stantial degree by the one restrained;
5. the number of persons to whom alienation is prohibited is small (see Commentsj
and k);
6. the one upon whom the restraint is imposed is a charity.
The following factors, when found to be present, tend to support the conclusion that the
restraint is unreasonable:
1. the restraint is capricious;
2. the restraint is imposed for spite or malice;
3. the one imposing the restraint has no interest in land that is benefited by the en-
forcement of the restraint;
4. the restraint is unlimited in duration;
5. the number of persons to whom alienation is prohibited is large (see Commentsj
and k).
The factors listed above as tending to support a conclusion that the restraint is reason-
able and those listed as tending to the opposite conclusion are not exhaustive." RESTATE-
MENT OF PROPERTY § 406, Comment 1 (1944).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 27 Ariz. App. at 520, 556 P.2d at 821.
69. Id. at 518, 556 P.2d at 819.
70. Id.
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pose: the widow Della was guaranteed the exclusive right of occupancy
of her home during her lifetime.71 In light of these factors evidencing
the reasonableness of the restraint, the court felt that the matter of price
was more properly left for determination by the parties. 72
In Kintner v. Wruble,73 a Pennsylvania trial court adopted a signif-
icantly more lenient approach to evaluating the reasonableness of fixed
price preemptive rights. Plaintiff, owner of a farm, was crippled with
arthritis and spent most of his time in a hospital. The plaintiff desired
to sell the farm, while retaining the farmhouse to live in while he was
outside the hospital. Accordingly, he sold the farm, less the property
upon which the house was built, to defendant, giving defendant the
preemptive right to purchase the house for $500 should plaintiff or his
heirs ever desire to sell it. Eleven years later, for reasons not stated in
the opinion, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to have the preemptive
provision declared void as against public policy.
The court began its discussion by specifically rejecting the ap-
proach suggested in the Restatement of Property.74 Instead, the court
chose to view preemptive rights as a type of absolute option to
purchase, i e., an option to purchase upon a condition precedent, the
condition precedent being the owner's desire to sell. Thus, if and when
the owner decides to sell and so notifies the optionee, the conditional
provision matures into an absolute option. The court first noted the
validity of option contracts in general and options upon condition pre-
cedent in particular.75 Having concluded that such preemptive rights
were generally acceptable, the court focused on the fixed price element
of the particular restraint before it. A review of decisions in other juris-
dictions convinced the court that there was authority upholding fixed
price preemptive rights in circumstances in which such restraints were
reasonable.76 Yet the Kintner court went even further, holding that a
71. Id.
72. Id. at 520, 556 P.2d at 821.
73. 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 574 (1958).
74. "We have read with much interest, but little profit, the restatement and the aca-
demic discussion contained therein. To try to follow the writer required considerable time,
and in the end we, too, were on the sea of uncertainty." Id. at 576.
75. "Of course, plaintiff's agreement involves a negative promise not to sell to anyone
without giving defendant the first refusal, and to that extent it is a restraint on alienation, but
that restraint is no more and no less than the same restraint on his right to sell to another
when he has, for a consideration, given an absolute option. That partial restraint is recog-
nized and upheld by all the courts. We submit that the useful, social purpose served by it is
served equally by an option on condition. In each case, dealing at arm's length and for a
consideration, the one grants a right to the other." Id. at 577.
76. Ironically, the court relied heavily on the Kershner decision as support for the "rea-
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fixed price term alone could not render a preemptive right invalid.77
Despite the court's extreme posture, it paid careful attention to the rea-
sonableness of the contract's underlying purpose, which, in view of the
plaintiffs physical infirmities, the court characterized as "laudable and
legitimate."78
These cases illustrate that fixed price preemptive rights often are
viewed as at least suspect and that no other jurisdiction appears to
grant the unconditional validity conferred upon them by the California
Court of Appeal in Schwartz and Mercer.
Proposed Resolution in California
As Tucker and Wellenkamp demonstrate, the California Supreme
Court strongly disfavors restraints on alienation, yet will tolerate them
when the justification for a particular restraint outweighs the quantum
of restraint resulting therefrom. 79 Applying this balancing test, how-
ever, may prove difficult and unduly restrictive in fixed price preemp-
tive right cases.
First, it is difficult to imagine how a court would usefully assess the
justification for a fixed price preemptive right. Consider, for example,
Schwartz v. Shapiro,80 discussed earlier. Although the Shapiros clearly
had a strong and understandable interest in determining their future
business partners, there is no reason why a "best offer" preemptive
right would not have served this purpose equally well. Consequently,
sonableness" approach. Id. at 581-82. As noted above, the Kershner court, while espousing
reasonableness, appeared to be quite predisposed to find all fixed price preemptive rights
unreasonable. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
77. 'Trice is generally an essential ingredient of every contract for the transfer of prop-
erty or interests therein and must be certain or capable of being ascertained by the terms of
the contract. So, with every option contract, a fixed price or a means must be agreed upon to
determine the price before it can be valid .... If a fixed price be necessary in an option,
why should its presence in an option upon condition render it null and void?" Id. at 583.
78. As the court noted. "It must be borne in mind that a small house is involved and
that it should have been included in the sale of the entire farm. Only because of plaintiffs ill
health, only to accommodate him when he wanted to use it during his absence from the
hospitals, did the grantee agree not to insist on its conveyance at the time. What is a farm
without a home upon it? On the other hand, who would want to live in a small house next to
a barn unless he had to in order to take care of the animals and the barn proper?. . .Here
we have proof of the purpose of the parties inserting the covenant in the deed. And what is
more, it is a reasonable provision agreed upon to carry out a laudable and legitimate pur-
pose." Id. at 581.
79. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. App. 3d 943, 953, 582 P.2d 970, 977, 148
Cal. Rptr. 379, 386 (1978).
80. 229 Cal. App. 2d 238, 40 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1964). For a discussion of the Schwartz
case see text accompanying notes 12-19 supra.
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under this test fixed price elements will fare poorly, absent unusual cir-
cumstances justifying a predetermined price.
Second, the quantum of restraint imposed by a fixed price preemp-
tive right might prove difficult to assess. On the one hand, fixed price
preemptive rights arguably impose less restraint than due-on-sale
clauses: one owning land subject to a fixed price preemptive right is at
all times free to convey the land and never faces anything so drastic as
the foreclosure of a mortgage. Equally arguable, however, is that fixed
price preemptive rights pose a potentially greater restraint than due-on-
sale clauses. For example, although the plaintiffs in Tucker alleged a
loss of only $3,700 resulting from enforcement of a due-on-sale clause,
the plaintiffs in Schwartz lost some $28,500 by reason of a fixed price
preemptive provision.
If the justification versus quantum of restraint test alone is insuffi-
cient to evaluate preemptive rights, California courts must find some
workable resolution to eliminate the dangers inherent in fixed price
preemptive agreements. While the California Supreme Court conceiv-
ably might adopt the position taken in Missouri State Highway Commis-
sion v. Stone,81 such a decision would be unfortunate; adoption of a
rule creating a presumption against the validity of fixed price preemp-
tive rights would virtually eliminate a court's discretion to uphold po-
tentially reasonable provisions. As to adopting the liberal attitude
embodied in Tovrea v. Umphress,82 the drastic erosion of the less liberal
Minderhout decision is an indication that the California Supreme
Court is not likely to look so favorably upon fixed price preemptive
rights. A fortiori, the extreme approach taken by the Pennsylvania
court in Kintner v. Wruble83 surely will find little support in California.
Recognizing the disfavor in which restraints on alienation are held
in California, this Article proposes a method of analyzing fixed price
preemptive provisions which will reinforce the California Supreme
Court's pronounced attitude toward restraints on alienation without re-
quiring an outright ban on such provisions. Although any court con-
fronting a fixed price preemptive right certainly should attempt to
balance the justification for the proposed restraint against the quantum
of restraint resulting therefrom, consideration of two additional factors
81. 311 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958). For a discussion of the Stone case see text
accompanying notes 53-61 supra.
82. 27 Ariz. App. 513, 556 P.2d 814 (1976). For a discussion of the Tovrea case see text
accompanying notes 62-72 supra.
83. 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 574 (1958). For a discussion of the Kintner case see text accompa-
nying notes 73-78 supra.
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will aid significantly in an evaluation of fixed price preemptive rights.
These two factors are the parity of bargaining power between the re-
spective parties and intangible or nonmonetary consideration passing
to the restrained party to compensate for later potential monetary loss.
Parity of Bargaining Power
A strong argument can be made that two parties of relatively equal
business acumen and bargaining power should be free to enter into pre-
emptive right provisions on whatever terms they subjectively determine
to be satisfactory. While a fixed price preemptive right provision might
produce a substantial monetary loss, it could be viewed as no more
than an honest mistake in judgment resulting in a bad bargain-rarely,
if ever, a defense to an otherwise valid contract.84 On the other hand,
when the business acumen or bargaining power is not substantially
equal between two parties, greater justification exists for a court to pro-
tect the weaker party from having a grossly unfavorable fixed price pre-
emptive right imposed upon it.85
This analysis is consistent with the results obtained in most of the
California cases discussed above. For example, in Wellenkamp, Tuck-
er, and La Sala, the due-on clauses were not freely negotiated by the
parties.86 Rather, individuals wishing to obtain financing from lending
institutions were confronted with standard form contracts on a "take it
or leave it" basis. In circumstances such as these, preemptive provi-
sions, like all other forms of restraint on alienation, should be at least
highly suspect.87
84. See, e.g., M.F. Kemper Constr. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 37 Cal. 2d 696,235 P.2d
7 (1951); White v. Berrenda Mesa Water Dist., 7 Cal. App. 3d 894, 87 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1970);
Reid v. Landon, 166 Cal. App. 2d 476, 333 P.2d 432 (1958); Brunzell Constr. Co. v. G.J.
Weisbrod, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 2d 278, 285 P.2d 989 (1955).
85. This argument more commonly is used to attack the validity of one or more provi-
sions in an adhesion contract. For a general discussion of the validity of such contracts in
California see Comment, Contracts ofAdhesion Under California Law, 1 U.S.F. L. Rav. 306
(1967).
86. Notably, the court in Wellenkamp explicitly noted that it was limiting its holding to
"institutional lenders," and did not address the enforceability of due-on clauses by "private
vendors," presumably those who are on an equal bargaining level with individual purchas-
ers. 21 Cal. App. 3d at 952, n.9, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
87. The significance of this first factor is somewhat diminished by the fact that fixed
price preemptive provisions are not as frequently inserted into adhesion contracts as are the
most popular due-on clauses. Hence, the frequency of seeing parties of disparate bargaining
power litigating the validity of such provisions is expected to be quite small. Indeed, as the
case law suggests, a fixed price preemptive provision is much more common between indi-
viduals who have negotiated the purchase of a piece of real estate. See, e.g., Tovrea v.
Umphress, 27 Ariz. App. 513, 556 P.2d 814 (1976); Kintner v. Wruble, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 574
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Nonmonetary Consideration to Restrained Party
As the above analysis of decisional law in various jurisdictions in-
dicates, fixed price preemptive agreements imposing reasonable re-
straints on alienation have on occasion been upheld. Courts holding
preemptive provisions valid have emphasized special nonmonetary or
intangible benefits passing to the grantor of the preemptive right, which
compensated that party for the possibility of monetary loss resulting
from subsequent enforcement of the right. Where such special consid-
eration is found to have passed to the grantor of the preemptive right, a
court reviewing the validity of the provision should be more reluctant
to invalidate it, in spite of any apparent disparity between the fixed
price term and the fair market value of the subject property.
This analysis is consistent with the cases validating fixed price pre-
emptive rights discussed above. In Tovrea, for example, Ms. Tovrea
entered into a fixed price preemptive agreement which obligated her,
should she ever decide to sell her home, to sell it for approximately one
half of its market value. In return for this monetary sacrifice, however,
Ms. Tovrea was able to resolve a conflict with the heirs of her late hus-
band which might have resulted in a forced sale of her home. In addi-
tion, she guaranteed the family corporation, of which she was a part
owner, convenient land for future expansion. Under these circum-
stances, which the court emphasized, there is little reason for any court
to deem such a contract unreasonable or against public policy.
Similarly, the plaintiff in Kintner, who was obligated to sell a po-
tentially valuable house for the fixed price of $500, gained a great deal
in the bargain. By agreeing to sell the farmhouse to the purchaser of
the surrounding farm at a fixed price, if and when he decided to sell,
Mr. Kintner was able to retain the home that was so important to him
during the occasional periods when he was free to leave the hospital.
Turning this analysis to the Schwartz and Mercer decisions, it is
impossible to discover any corresponding special nonmonetary consid-
eration passing to the restrained parties. In Schwartz, each party to the
agreement had a preemptive right to purchase the other party's interest
in the subject property at a fixed price. The only nonmonetary benefit
which each party acquired as a result of the preemptive right agree-
ment was the ability to prevent the other party from selling to an unde-
(1958). The importance of considering the relative bargaining strengths of parties to a fixed
price preemptive agreement, nevertheless, is quite obvious: if a party possessing greater bar-
gaining power unconditionally restrains the other party's power to dispose of the subject
property, the restraint created, in all probability, would be unreasonable.
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sirable future purchaser.8 8 This benefit, however, could have been
obtained with precisely equal efficiency by use of a best offer clause.
The fixed price element thus became purely punitive, creating a wind-
fall profit for the last party to sell.
Similarly, in Mercer, there was no indication that the party re-
strained by the fixed price provision received any special nonmonetary
consideration in the bargain. On the contrary, the court recognized
that the preemptive right had been granted solely as an incentive for
the original purchaser to enter into the transaction. The consideration
passing to the grantor of the preemptive right appears to have been
strictly monetary.89
Conclusion
The decisions in Schwartz and Mercer have stood for fifteen years
without comment or criticism from the California Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, recent California Supreme Court decisions demonstrate
that the court is retreating from a permissive attitude toward restraints
on alienation. If the court were confronted today with the question of
the validity of a fixed price preemptive agreement, it certainly would
demand a greater showing of reasonableness than that demanded in
either Schwartz or Mercer.
In adjudicating the validity of any fixed price preemptive right, a
court should, of course, attempt to apply the "justification versus quan-
tum of restraint" test developed by the California Supreme Court for
evaluating due-on clauses. Consideration of two additional factors,
however, will aid a court in its determination of the validity of fixed
price preemptive rights. These two factors are the parity of bargaining
power between the respective parties and the special nonmonetary con-
sideration given to the restrained party to compensate for the potential
subsequent monetary loss.
By taking these factors into consideration, California courts should
88. Indeed, the court in Schwartz mentioned that the parties had discussed the "possi-
bility of either party selling his interest to 'someone not of the white race."' Schwartz v.
Shapiro, 229 Cal. App. 2d 238, 242-43, 40 Cal. Rptr. 189, 192 (1964). If the reason for the
insertion of the preemptive provision was to prevent the sale of the subject property on the
basis of the potential purchaser's race, there is an even greater reason for finding the pre-
emptive provision in Schwartz both unreasonable and against public policy, particularly in
light of such cases as Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
89. As the court noted, "tlestimony was given to the effect that parcel I would not have
been purchased by plaintiffs without the hope that they could purchase the adjoining lot for
$10,000 when and if defendant decided to sell." Mercer v. Lemmens, 230 Cal. App. 2d 167,
171, 40 Cal. Rptr. 803, 806 (1964).
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achieve results both consonant with those reached in the majority of
other jurisdictions today and compatible with the current California
Supreme Court attitude toward restraints on alienation.
